The mind and the mental*
by Javier Bolaños
The statements that Alan Turing made in 1950 seem no longer to scandalize anyone. The progress of cognitive science (artificial intelligence, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, etcetera) has allowed to assert ideas such as ‘the brain functions as an information processor’.
We can accept this proposal in first instance, but before we do that it would be convenient to know how an information processor works (what is known as a computer). It would be even more interesting to ask how it is expected to work. The answers and debates quickly proliferate: there are some who pretend, for instance, that a computer works with transparent and simple definitions, with the objective to reach the absolute logic precision; others, however, prefer it to be by knitting, or knots, where each one of these, contrasting with the others to acquire different perspectives, give meaning to the rest. This is not a minor difference, since two conceptions of the human can be involved in it.
In any way, it seems to be an agreement that, however it works, the brain is “the” cause of the mind; that is to say: the mind, without any doubt, some say, is a biological phenomenon. However, we must not hurry and assume that any agreement have been reached, so easily, on what, in science, the biological convey. What is at stake here, refers to how do we conceptualize life
It is necessary to clarify that, in biology we no longer talk about what life means, but rather about how the living systems work. Apparently, it is inevitable to consider, there, a unitary formal value.
In that direction, just like in biology, the brain working like a computer indicates that, beforehand, its functionality is linked to a system of numbers and rules. This entails, of course, a cost: as a result of the above mentioned we end up with no knowledge about what life is about.
The aforementioned approaches seem to reduce human nature to the level of an artifact. Having said that, these artifacts are in tension with the disputes about evolution, biology, logic, etcetera.
In addition, this is a difficulty: the new developments of symptomatology frequently force to re-define biology, to sustain its operability. In these matters, a temporal dimension gains value, the emergence of those new developments resignifies the previous state. Needless to say, this does not happen without a purpose. Perhaps it is convenient to reflect on the fact that there is (are) biology(ies), on the one hand, but there are also policies on that (those) biology(ies), on the other hand, and usually, this is unnoticed.
However, there is something that does not fit in: if the mind shows itself, therefore, as a result of computable, measurable and biological products, that is not what we experience from working with the mental. Furthermore, this is where we establish the difference. The experience in psychoanalysis shows us that the mental, rather than a way to adjective the mind, refers to effects, even products, that are uncomputable. The uncomputable only indicates that the obtained result has no value, this means that it cannot be taken into account to be used as a model answer. This is the cause of subjective indeterminacy.
If it is expected of the mind a certain logical co-relation of elements that usually tend to unify themselves. It can perfectly be conceived, and it is necessary to do so, as a faculty to be interpreted. That is the task performed by the mental (as an exercise), as it presents itself only as a temporal interpretation of the mind. The difficulty lies, precisely, in the fact that it is not possible to measure or regulate the sense of it.
It is stated that the mind is determined by the brain, but the mental, on the other hand, also requires the symbolic order. It is, the mental, even structured from the incidence of the latter: the mind. That is the reason why the difficulty we find in our practice refers, mainly, to the fact that we do not know exactly what to do, each time, with the Other (nor with the others, of course). It is not known what to do with what occurs and cannot be prevented.
It is possible, then, to consider a health of the mind. Yet, a Mental Health?
* In Revista Saltos 1. Translation from Spanish: Florencia Bernthal Raz.